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In setting the stage for our presentations and discussions, let me provide just a few personal observations, which I hope are not overly provocative. If so, I extend my apologies. I speak to you now as a hospital administrator, an executive who's led institutions on both coasts as well as in the midwest.
The physicians with whom I have worked aren't trained to diagnose anthrax, smallpox, or plague. In fact, they've never seen a single case. The chief executive officers (CEOs) whom I know (i.e., of hospitals) just don't have bioterrorism on their screens. Bioterrorism, after all, is a low-probability danger with no federal funding-while my CEO colleagues deal daily with 100% certain dangers that have significant financial ramifications for their institutions in addi-tion to dealing with staff shortages, shrinking hospital margins, and rapidly runaway pharmacy costs, to mention just a few.
In some US cities, public health departments and private hospital leadership don't talk to one another, at least certainly at the senior-most level. In fact, in my opinion, I think they live in parallel universes, not knowing each other's names, not having met one another, not knowing each other's telephone numbers, not truly knowing each other's responsibilities or problems.
Federal policy is based on a premise that the feds will act only in support of, as I understand it, local civilian efforts. Now, this policy just may be, it seems to me, flawed from the outset in that it assumes, first, that there are local plans for local effort and, second, that those local plans, in fact, could manage for the necessary 48 or 72 or 96 hours, before, federal support would come in.
Many of my colleagues in hospital leadership positions are unconvinced of the premise of this policy. Furthermore, federal policy profoundly underestimates, in my opinion, the lack of surge capacity in the US private hospital sector. It fails to recognize the human resource shortages that affect current (i.e., daily) operations. For example, for 10 days last December 1999, during a relatively mild flu epidemic, three quarters of Los Angeles's emergency departments were so full that ambulances had to be rerouted.
As a leader and a part-time student of complex organizations, I am a believer in simplicity-simplicity insofar as routine operations are concerned and all the more so in times of crisis or disaster. However, as regards the full panoply of federal and civilian agency response plans to bioterrorism, I must confess that, even with an advanced degree and having heard numerous descriptions of the federal response plan, I am still confused. The complexity, the alphabet soup of agencies and units, defies at least my common sense.
My hope is that our panelists will disabuse me of some of these impressions-or that at least we will set the stage for energetic discussion.
